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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Many scholars have observed that the Constitution of the United 
States can be understood as an example of what Cass Sunstein calls 
an “incompletely theorized agreement.”1  The Constitution contains 
a number of extremely general terms, such as “liberty,” “necessary 
and proper,” and “due process.”2  The Framers of the Constitution, it 
  
 ∗   J.D., Harvard Law School, magna cum laude, June 2010. 
 1. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. 
REV. 1733, 1739 (1995).  The article itself notes that constitutional provisions are 
often incompletely specified.  Id.  For an explicit treatment of the U.S. Constitu-
tion as incompletely theorized in the sense of containing incompletely specified 
provisions, see, for example, A.E. Dick Howard, The Indeterminacy of Constitu-
tions, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 383 (1996).  For an implicit treatment in the con-
text of the Fourteenth Amendment, see Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Under-
standing and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1, 61 (1955) (consider-
ing Senate debate on the Fourteenth Amendment, “may it not be that the Mod-
erates and the Radicals reached a compromise permitting them to go to the country 
with language which they could, where necessary, defend against damaging 
alarms raised by the opposition, but which at the same time was sufficiently elastic 
to permit reasonable future advances?”). 
 2. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 & amend. XIV, § 1. 
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is suggested, did not attempt to specify precisely how each of these 
principles would operate in every case.3  On this view, the Constitu-
tion is incompletely theorized in the sense of representing “a com-
fortable and even emphatic agreement on a general principle, ac-
companied by sharp disagreement about particular cases.”4  For ex-
ample, the Framers presumably could have agreed on the value of 
liberty in the abstract but disagreed sharply on its application to 
slaves.5 
There is, however, another sense in which the Constitution can 
be seen as an incompletely theorized agreement.  This second sense 
has received less attention in the existing scholarship, perhaps be-
cause it appears to conflict with the first.  According to this sense, 
the Constitution is remarkable for containing so little theory and so 
few statements of general principle.  What the interpretations of the 
Constitution in the previous paragraph take to be statements of gen-
eral principle are, on closer inspection, almost never merely state-
ments of principle.  Outside of its errata and signatures, the Constitu-
tion of 1787 consists of only two elements: the single, performative 
sentence of the Preamble and the series of commands and permis-
sions that make up the body of the document.  Neither of these ele-
ments offers abstract, theoretical statements of general principle.  On 
the one hand, the performative Preamble is not, strictly speaking, a 
descriptive statement at all; it is a performative enactment of the will 
of “the People” ratifying the Constitution at conventions across the 
thirteen states.6  On the other hand, every clause in the body of the 
  
 3. See Bickel, supra note 1, at 62; Howard, supra note 1, at 392–95. 
 4. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1739. 
 5. As Lincoln would later put it: “We all declare for liberty; but . . . [w]ith some 
the word liberty may mean for each man to do as he pleases with himself, and the 
product of his labor; while with others the same word may mean for some men to 
do as they please with other men, and the product of other men’s labor.”  Abraham 
Lincoln, Address at Sanitary Fair, Baltimore, Maryland (Apr. 18, 1864), in 
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 1859–1865, at 589 (Don E. Fe-
hrenbacher ed., 1989). 
 6. See AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 3–53 
(2005) (arguing for the significance of the Preamble as not only text but deed, a 
performative enactment of popular sovereignty).  On the peculiar characteristics of 
performatives, see generally J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (J.O. 
Urmson & Marina Sbisà eds., 2d ed. 1978). 
File: Brazeal - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on: 5/30/2011 11:24:00 PM Last Printed: 5/30/2011 11:25:00 PM 
2011 A MACHINE MADE OF WORDS 427 
document, without exception, is constructed around either a “shall,” 
a “may,” or a “shall not.”7  In grammatical form and function, these 
clauses are not theoretical justifications or elaborations.  They are 
highly pragmatic directives. 
The Constitution can thus be seen as an instance of the general 
phenomenon that Sunstein also finds at work in the agreement of 
judges on particular outcomes even where there is disagreement on 
the theory supporting the outcome.8  That is, “when people diverge 
on some (relatively) high-level proposition, they might be able to 
agree if they lower the level of abstraction.”9  The members of the 
Philadelphia Convention might have had any number of theoretical 
rationales for adopting the specific rules contained in the body of the 
Constitution, some controversial, some uncontroversial.  The notion 
of a social contract might have dictated the rules, or the rules might 
have been dictated by the will of God, the practical lessons of histo-
ry, mere pragmatism, or some combination of the above.10  But be-
cause the Framers did not include theoretical justifications or expla-
nations within the body of the Constitution, it was not necessary to 
reach agreement on high-level abstractions.  Like judges who agree 
on an outcome without agreeing on any high-level jurisprudential 
theory to dictate the outcome, the participants at the Convention 
were able to facilitate the drafting and ratification of the Constitution 
precisely by avoiding the “statements of general principle” that the 
Constitution is sometimes said to contain. 
  
 7. The first and only explanatory clause appears in the Second Amendment.  
See U.S. CONST. amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State . . . .”).  On the exceptional nature of this clause within the U.S. 
Constitution, see Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 793 n.1 (1998). 
 8. See Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1740–41. 
 9. Id.  
 10. For the breadth of theoretical disagreements among the Framers, see general-
ly JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING 
OF THE CONSTITUTION (1996).  James Madison remarked on the existence of con-
flicting theories even during the Convention.  “Mr. Maddison [sic] observed that 
Gentlemen reasoned very clear on most points under discussion, but they drew 
different conclusions.  What is the reason?  Because they reason from different 
principles.”  1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 147 (Max 
Farrand ed., 1966) [hereinafter FARRAND]. 
File: Brazeal - Vol. 9, Iss. 3, V2 Created on:  5/30/2011 11:24:00 PM Last Printed: 5/30/2011 11:25:00 PM 
428     UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 9, No. 3 
As the next section will argue, many state constitutions in the re-
volutionary era did offer explanations and justifications for their 
functional legal rules.  Additionally, in the years since the summer of 
1787, the drafters of many national constitutions have made a similar 
choice.  To take only the two earliest examples, the celebrated Polish 
Constitution of May 3, 1791 begins with a lengthy, religiously in-
fused preamble (“In the name of God, One in the Holy Trinity! . . . 
[p]ersuaded that our common fate depends entirely upon the estab-
lishing and rendering perfect a national constitution . . . .”11) and 
offers frequent statements of principle in justification of its choice of 
rules.12  The French Constitution of September 3, 1791 similarly 
presents numerous statements of abstract principle and theoretical 
justification.13 
But the Framers of the U.S. Constitution chose not to theorize 
their agreement anywhere outside of the minimal, fairly unobtrusive, 
and apparently uncontroversial purpose clause (“in Order to . . . .”) 
within the Preamble.14  The relative absence of theory in the Consti-
tution is all the more remarkable given the vast symbolic importance 
that the Constitution has acquired in American life.15  One might 
  
 11. USTAWA RZĄDOWA [CONSTITUTION] May 3, 1791, pmbl. (Pol.), translated 
in RETT R. LUDWIKOWSKI & WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., THE BEGINNING OF THE 
CONSTITUTIONAL ERA 303 (1993). 
 12. See, e.g., id. art. I (“but as the same holy religion commands us to love our 
neighbors . . . .”). 
 13. See, e.g., CONST. OF 1791, Sept. 3, 1791, tit. I (Fr.), translated in 
LUDWIKOWSKI & FOX, JR., supra note 11, at 228 (“since liberty consists of being 
able to do only whatever is not injurious to the rights of others or to public securi-
ty . . . .”); id. tit. III (“Sovereignty is one, indivisible, inalienable, and imprescript-
ible.”). 
 14. U.S. CONST. pmbl.  After the revised Preamble emerged from the Committee 
of Style and Arrangement, its purpose clause apparently attracted little controver-
sy.  Farrand, at least, records no debate over the clause.  Cf. 3 FARRAND, supra 
note 10, at 651–85 (reviewing the general index, which contains no reference to 
the Preamble). 
 15. See, e.g., Abraham Lincoln, Address to the Young Men’s Lyceum of Spring-
field, Illinois (Jan. 27, 1838), in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 
1832–1858, at 32 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (“[S]o to the support of the 
Constitution and Laws, let every American pledge his life, his property, and his 
sacred honor . . . . And, in short, let it become the political religion of the na-
tion . . . .”). 
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expect such a symbolically weighted document to set forth a number 
of stirring declarations of principle, perhaps of the sort that the Dec-
laration of Independence contains.16  But the U.S. Constitution, out-
side the Preamble, does not.  Whatever principles it might contain 
are apparently to be found in or between its bare legal rules or per-
haps in its principled theoretical silence.  Despite its reputation, the 
Constitution is less a stirring poem than a pragmatic, functionalist 
machine.  In that sense, it may end up fitting a very American idea of 
what a poem is: William Carlos Williams’ definition of a poem is a 
“machine made of words.”17 
II.  BASELINE COMPARISONS: STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION 
Judged in comparison to such feats of theoretical elaboration as 
the 1982 Chinese Constitution, with its thousand-word historical 
preamble and two thousand prefatory words of “General Prin-
ciples,”18 or the recent, failed European Union Constitution, weigh-
ing in at over four hundred pages in its “Reader-Friendly Edition,”19 
the U.S. Constitution certainly seems laconic.  Likewise, compared 
to national constitutions drafted in the twentieth century, especially 
those that contain “directive principles” aiming to guide interpreta-
tion,20 the U.S. Constitution seems minimalist in its use of theory.  
But was the Constitution’s lack of theoretical self-justification ex-
ceptional at the time it was drafted? 
  
 16. Cf. ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS 
AND THE LAW 134 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (“If you want aspirations, you can 
read the Declaration of Independence . . . . There is no such philosophizing in our 
Constitution, which . . . is a practical and pragmatic charter of government.”). 
 17. WILLIAM CARLOS WILLIAMS, SELECTED ESSAYS OF WILLIAM CARLOS 
WILLIAMS 256 (New Directions 1969) (1954). 
 18. See XIANFA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 4, 1982, pmbl., art. 1–32 (China), trans-
lated in THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 3–28 (1983). 
 19. See generally THE PROPOSED EU CONSTITUTION: THE READER-FRIENDLY 
EDITION (Jens-Peter Bonde ed., 2d ed. 2007), available at 
http://en.euabc.com/upload/readerfriendlybook.pdf. 
 20. For the existence of directive principles in the Irish and Indian Constitutions, 
see VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
709, 715 (2d ed. 2006). 
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In order to answer this question, we can compare the U.S. Con-
stitution to the state constitutions drafted between 1776 and 1787, as 
well as the Articles of Confederation.  The investigation will attempt 
to divide the contents of the constitutional documents into two gen-
eral categories: functional rules and non-functional, theoretical ele-
ments.  Inevitably, there will be a degree of imprecision in such an 
exercise, given the occasional difficulty of defining what should and 
should not count as functional or theoretical and the differences in 
the format and structure of the various constitutional documents.  It 
also goes without saying that even the most “theoretical” element in 
a constitution can be described as serving some function, and even 
the most functional rule can be described as resting upon theoretical 
assumptions.  But in practice, the distinction between functional 
rules and theory is sufficiently stable to produce useful results. 
First, a few methodological notes are in order.  Preambles tend to 
serve almost exclusively as explanations or justifications for the 
documents that follow.  In the case of revolutionary-era state consti-
tutions, preambles almost always recount (in the form of several 
“whereas” clauses) the history leading up to the creation of the doc-
uments.  For these reasons, I have placed preambles in a separate 
category.  The implication is that preambles tend to be, as a catego-
ry, theoretical elements.  Similarly, because Declarations of Rights 
tend to be permeated by statements of general principle whose func-
tional value, if any, would be difficult to determine in any consistent 
way, I have placed them in a separate category as well.21 
Finally, I have defined the parts of a constitution outside of its 
title, preamble, Declaration of Rights (if any), and signatures, as the 
“body” of the text.  Within this body, I have defined as “theory” any 
clauses that solely offer explanations, justifications, or purposes for 
  
 21. The heightened likelihood that statements about fundamental rights, as op-
posed to statements about government structure, will incorporate explanatory and 
purposive clauses can be seen even outside formal Declarations of Rights.  See, 
e.g., N.Y. CONST. of 1777, arts. XXXVII–XL, reprinted in 5 THE FEDERAL AND 
STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE 
STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES 2636–37 (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 
1909) [hereinafter THORPE].  That is, the material that usually appears within Dec-
larations of Rights tends to be accompanied by theoretical statements even when it 
appears outside such Declarations.  See id.  
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the rules contained in the body.  These theoretical clauses can be 
anything from the simplest “to” or “for” clause (“to prevent alterca-
tion about such bills, it is declared . . . .”22 and “for the more perfect 
satisfaction of the public, the reasons and motives for making such 
laws shall be fully and clearly expressed . . . .”23) to the most elabo-
rate statements of principle (“And whereas the ministers of the gos-
pel are, by their profession, dedicated to the service of God and the 
care of souls, and ought not to be diverted from the great duties of 
their function; therefore, no minister of the gospel, or priest of any 
denomination whatsoever, shall . . . .”24). 
Measured within these parameters, how does the theoretical con-
tent of the U.S. Constitution compare to that of other revolutionary-
era constitutional documents?  Table 1 provides the quantity of 
theory in revolutionary-era constitutional documents. 
  
 22. MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 21, at 1693 
(emphasis added). 
 23. PA. CONST. of 1776, § 15, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3086 
(emphasis added).  
 24. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXIX, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 
2637 (emphasis added).  
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New Hamp-
shire (Jan. 5, 
1776)25 
404 N/A 526 0 0% 
South Caro-
lina (Mar. 26, 
1776)26 
1300 N/A 2425 12 0.5% 
Virginia 
(June 12 & 
29, 1776)27 








N/A32 N/A 3412 12 0.4% 
  
 25. N.H. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2451. 
 26. S.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3241. 
 27. VA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 7 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3812.  Virginia 
ratified its Declaration of Rights on June 12, 1776 and its Constitution on June 29, 
1776.  7 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3812 n.a. 
 28. This figure includes both the lengthy preamble to the Constitution and the 
very brief preamble to the Declaration of Rights.  Id. pmbl., reprinted in 7 
THORPE, supra note 21, at 3812, 3814–15. 
 29. N.J. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2594. 
 30. This figure is based on treating the following phrase as a justification clause: 
“That the legislative department of this government may, as much as possible, be 
preserved from all suspicion of corruption . . . .”  Id. art. XX,  reprinted in 5 
THORPE, supra note 21, at 2598.  In context, the sentence may then become un-
grammatical, or at least acquire a grammatical structure different from that of the 
other articles.  But there appears to be no other plausible way to interpret the sense 
of the clause.  A similar construction appears in MD. CONST. of 1776, art. XI, re-
printed in 3 THORPE, supra note 21, at 1693. 
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109 2459 6229 68 1.1% 
North Caro-
lina (Dec. 18, 
1776)36 
294 1060 2529 037 0% 
Georgia (Feb. 
5, 1777)38 




2444 N/A 5274 351 6.7% 
Vermont (Ju-
ly 8, 1777)40 
1174 1219 3904 196 5.0% 
South Caro-
lina (Mar. 19, 
1778)41 
237 N/A 5304 91 1.7% 
  
 31. DEL. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 21, at 562. 
 32. I have not counted the fifty-two word title of the Delaware Constitution.  See 
id. 
 33. PA. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3081. 
 34. It might be worth noting that § 46 of the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution 
incorporates the contents of Pennsylvania’s theory-laden Declaration of Rights 
into the state’s Constitution, thereby arguably increasing the theoretical content of 
the Constitution relative to the 1787 U.S. Constitution.  Compare id. § 46, re-
printed in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3091, with U.S. CONST. 
 35. MD. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 21, at 1686. 
 36. N.C. CONST. of 1776, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2787. 
 37. Like Pennsylvania’s Constitution, North Carolina’s Constitution incorporates 
the state’s highly theoretical Declaration of Rights into the state’s constitution.  Id. 
art. XLIV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2794. 
 38. GA. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 2 THORPE, supra note 21, at 777. 
 39. N.Y. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2623. 
 40. VT. CONST. of 1777, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3737.  Ver-
mont also ratified a Constitution on July 4, 1786.  VT. CONST. of 1786, reprinted 
in 6 Thorpe, supra note 21, at 3749.  But it is substantially similar to the earlier 
one for the purposes of this table. 
 41. S.C. CONST. of 1778, reprinted in 6 THORPE, supra note 21, at 3248. 
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Massachu-
setts (1780) 42 
30343 2150 8952 522 5.8% 




N/A45 N/A 3387 88 2.6% 
U.S. Consti-
tution (1787) 
52 N/A 4440 046 0% 
Table 1.47 
 
The preceding table suggests that, viewed as a whole, the U.S. 
Constitution contains less theory than any comparable American 
constitutional document of the era.  First, the Preamble to the U.S. 
Constitution is shorter than that of any of the state constitutions.  It 
offers no history of the events leading up to its drafting, no recitation 
of “whereas” clauses, and contains even fewer words than the for-
mulistic, treaty-like invocation (“To all to whom these Presents shall 
come . . . .”) and extended title of the Articles of Confederation.48   
  
 42. MASS. CONST. of 1780, reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 21, at 1888. 
 43. This figure includes both the main preamble and the brief preamble to the 
section of the Constitution entitled “The Frame of Government.”  See id. pmbl., 
reprinted in 3 THORPE, supra note 21, at 1888–89, 1893. 
 44. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, reprinted in 1 THORPE, supra note 
21, at 9. 
 45. Perhaps because the Articles of Confederation have the basic form of a trea-
ty, there is no true preamble.  Instead, the Articles begin with a formula that often 
appeared at the start of treaties (“To all to whom these Presents shall come . . . .”), 
followed by a title including the names of all the states.  See id. 
 46. It has been suggested that the Copyright Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, 
might be read as containing an explanatory element.  See Volokh, supra note 7, at 
793 n.1.  But in context, the clause need not be read as offering an explanation of 
the purposes for which Congress should establish copyrights.  Rather, the clause 
grants Congress the power to pursue a general goal, and then the next clause de-
fines the (or at least a) specific means for achieving that goal.  In any case, when 
similar clauses appeared in state constitutions, that is, clauses arguably having the 
form of explanations but performing functional roles, I did not count them as 
theory. 
 47. The source for all constitutional materials is 1–7 THORPE, supra note 21. 
 48. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1777, pmbl., reprinted in 1 Thorpe, supra 
note 21, at 9. 
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Second, the 1787 U.S. Constitution contains no Declaration of 
Rights.  How this came to pass is an interesting question,49 but for 
the concerns of this article, it simply means that the original U.S. 
Constitution lacked the source of the vast majority of theoretical 
speculation found in many of the state constitutions.  Even if the Bill 
of Rights were included, the calculation of theoretical content would 
barely be affected.  Unlike the Declarations of Rights in many of the 
state constitutions, the Bill of Rights consists entirely of concise, 
functional rules in the form of “shall” and “shall not” statements, 
with a single, notorious exception—the “being necessary” clause of 
the Second Amendment.50  Also, if the Bill of Rights were treated as 
  
 49. See, e.g., 3 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 143–44 (referencing James Wilson’s 
explanation of the lack of a Bill of Rights). 
 50. U.S. CONST. amend. II; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.  The degree 
of confusion, disagreement, and general frustration generated by this thirteen-word 
passage in the Second Amendment may provide the best argument for the Fra-
mers’ anti-theoretical approach.  In addition, it is possible to question Volokh’s 
substantive claim that the justification clause of the Second Amendment should 
not be read as a condition on the operative clause.  See Volokh, supra note 7, at 
801.  As a preliminary matter, none of the ostensibly analogous justification claus-
es he locates in state constitutions share the relevant structure of the Second 
Amendment justification clause.  None of them refer to a factual state of affairs 
that may have been true in 1791 and may not be true now.  A better analogy for 
the structure of the “being necessary” clause would be the following.  Years ago, 
shortly before dying, a father issued the following command to his son: “An LL.B. 
from Yale being necessary to a successful legal career, you shall study law at 
Yale.”  Though it might have been the case at the time that an LL.B. from Yale 
was necessary for a successful legal career, it is probably not the case today—just 
as it is probably not the case today that the security of the United States, or of any 
one of the states, depends on the existence of well-regulated militias, though this 
might have been the case in 1791.  In fact, strictly speaking, Yale no longer even 
offers LL.B.s—just as, strictly speaking, state militias in their 1791 form no longer 
exist.  With these changed circumstances in mind, would the son be violating his 
father’s command by studying law at Stanford, or not studying law at all?  Who 
can say?  Clearly, the father did not contemplate this turn of events.  We can im-
agine any number of other, unstated reasons why the father might still wish his son 
to attend Yale; we can also imagine him specifically not wanting his son to attend 
Yale given the changed circumstances; or we can imagine him not caring one way 
or another, provided that his son has a successful legal career.  It would be entirely 
reasonable to read the justification clause either as a condition for the operative 
clause or not as one, and neither text, intent, nor the state of the world establishes 
one of the two interpretations as the correct one.  But see District of Columbia v. 
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the U.S. Constitution’s Declaration of Rights, it would still be the 
most concise of such Declarations, containing only 481 words, a 
little more than half as many words as the next most spare version.51 
Finally, the body of the U.S. Constitution does not contain a sin-
gle clause of justification, explanation, or purpose.  The only state 
constitutions that can say the same are the stopgap New Hampshire 
Constitution of January 1776, in which the state continues to refer to 
itself as a colony and pleads with Great Britain to create the condi-
tions for a return to its prior condition (“PROTESTING and 
DECLARING that we neaver [sic] sought to throw off our depen-
dence upon Great Britain, but felt ourselves happy under her protec-
tion . . . .”),52 and the exceptionally laconic North Carolina Constitu-
tion of December 1776, which nevertheless implicitly contains a 
great deal of theory by incorporating its accompanying, typically 
theoretical Declaration of Rights.53 
Thus, even when judged by contemporaneous standards, the U.S. 
Constitution is notable for its forbearance of theory. 
III.  HISTORY: DRAFTING AN INCOMPLETELY THEORIZED 
CONSTITUTION 
How did the U.S. Constitution come to contain so little in the 
way of theoretical principles, as opposed to pragmatic directives?  At 
least two explanations might be offered.  The first involves the gen-
eral institutional structure of the Philadelphia Convention.  The 
second involves the intellectual orientations of the primary drafters 
of the Constitution, especially James Wilson and Edmund Randolph.  
  
Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576–78, 598–600 (2008) (introducing categorical legal dis-
tinction between “prefatory clause[s]” and “operative clause[s],” concluding that 
“a prefatory clause does not limit or expand the scope of the operative clause,” and 
on that basis performing two-step analysis of Second Amendment, beginning with 
a determination of legal meaning of “operative clause” apart from “prefatory 
clause,” and only then asking whether the latter “fit[s] with” the preceding inter-
pretation of the former). 
 51. See U.S. CONST. amends. I–X.  
 52. N.H. CONST. of 1776, pmbl., reprinted in 4 THORPE, supra note 21, at 2452. 
 53. See N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. XLIV, reprinted in 5 THORPE, supra note 21, 
at 2794. 
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Both explanations lead to the conclusion that the work performed by 
the Committee of Detail between July 23 and August 6, 1787 was 
probably the decisive moment in the creation of our incompletely 
theorized Constitution.54  The document produced by the Committee 
of Detail contains arguably even less theory than the final Constitu-
tion.  On the one hand, it includes seven words of explanation in the 
body, whereas the Constitution includes none; on the other hand, its 
preamble contains substantially less of a statement of purpose.55 
According to the first explanation, the nature of the committee 
structure at the Philadelphia Convention might have encouraged the 
production of a rather untheoretical document, regardless of the draf-
ters’ rhetorical preferences.  The five-person Committee of Detail 
produced the first true draft of the Constitution, as distinct from var-
ious plans and resolutions phrased in rough, provisional wording.56  
The Convention charged the Committee of Detail with formalizing 
the results of the foregoing debate,57 much as a lawyer might draft a 
contract after its content had been negotiated between two parties.  
The immediate audience of the drafters in the Committee of Detail 
was, thus, the Convention, not the general public.58  This considera-
tion by itself might have led to the production of a more pragmatic 
and less theoretical document. 
Imagine, for example, if the Committee of Detail, under the in-
fluence of an especially theoretically minded member, or under the 
inspiration of one of the state constitutions, had produced a docu-
  
 54. See generally John R. Vile, The Critical Role of Committees at the U.S. Con-
stitutional Convention of 1787, 48 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 147, 163–66 (2006) (dis-
cussing the Committee of Detail). 
 55. See generally 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 177–189.  The seven words of 
explanation are “for the security of the parties concerned.”  Id. at 184.  In contrast 
to the preamble that emerged from the Committee of Style and Arrangement, the 
Committee of Detail’s preamble merely states: “We the people of the States of . . . 
do ordain, declare, and establish the following Constitution for the Government of 
Ourselves and our Posterity.”  Id. at 177; see Vile, supra note 54, at 171–72 (dis-
cussing the Committee of Style and Arrangement). 
 56. See Vile, supra note 54, at 163–64. 
 57. John C. Hueston, Note, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Conven-
tion: The Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of State and 
Federal Powers, 100 YALE L.J. 765, 766 (1990) (discussing the modesty of the 
Convention’s charge to the Committee). 
 58. See id. 
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ment freighted with declarations and explanations intended for a 
wider audience.59  Doing so would not only have run the risk of 
creating unnecessary controversy, as participants at the Convention 
debated the details of the declarations and explanations, but might 
also have invited some derision.  Confronted with a novel, unfami-
liar theoretical clause beside a hard-won, strenuously negotiated rule, 
some participants might reasonably have wondered on what basis the 
Committee of Detail had determined itself also to be the Committee 
of Political Philosophizing.  By far the safer, more lawyerly ap-
proach for the Committee of Detail, most of whose members had 
legal training, would have been to hew closely to the specific task 
they were given: explicitly, to formalize the rules agreed upon dur-
ing the debates; and perhaps implicitly, to fill any gaps between 
those rules as uncontroversially as possible. 
A second structural feature of the Committee of Detail might 
have reinforced the first: namely, that it was a committee.  Those 
who have worked on the drafting of a document in a committee set-
ting will probably be familiar with the tendency of committees to 
focus on anything that “stands out” from the rest of the document, 
whether in a good or bad way; to subject such elements to heigh-
tened scrutiny; and, as a result, to increase the chance that such ele-
ments will be mollified or removed.  The result tends to be writing 
that contains less obtrusive, idiosyncratic, or provocative elements 
than would be contained in writing from a single hand.  Phrased ne-
gatively, the result tends to be writing that is lifeless and bland, 
which may be why saying something reads like it was “written by 
committee” is a derogatory label, rather than a term of praise.  Any 
attempt by one of the members of the Committee of Detail to intro-
duce theoretical elaborations into the draft, especially inspirational 
  
 59. In particular, it is worth considering what James Madison or Gouverneur 
Morris might have produced, had they participated in the Committee of Detail.  
Madison’s original draft of the Bill of Rights, for example, contained two more 
justification clauses, in addition to the one in the Second Amendment.  See Vo-
lokh, supra note 7, at 796 n.10.  Morris, through his work on the Committee of 
Style and Arrangement, added the most overtly theoretical content to the Constitu-
tion, the “in order to” portion of the Preamble.  See RICHARD BROOKHISER, 
GENTLEMAN REVOLUTIONARY: GOUVERNEUR MORRIS, THE RAKE WHO WROTE 
THE CONSTITUTION 90–91 (2003); Vile, supra note 54, at 171. 
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statements of general principle or purpose, would have run counter 
to the general laws that seem to govern committee-based drafting. 
Finally, Jon Elster has argued that secrecy in constitutional nego-
tiations will tend to encourage practical bargaining, while public 
scrutiny will tend to encourage argument phrased in terms of impar-
tial values (or, less productively, “stubbornness, overbidding, and 
grandstanding”).60  He presents the Philadelphia Convention as a 
paradigmatic example of the former type of constitutional negotia-
tion.61  If Elster’s hypothesis is correct, then the secrecy of the Phila-
delphia Convention could have contributed to a relative de-emphasis 
on discussion in terms of general principles, which could, in turn, 
have contributed to the relative lack of theory in the Constitution. 
Another complementary explanation for the relative lack of 
theory in the U.S. Constitution may lie in the intellectual orientations 
of its drafters, and in particular, of Edmund Randolph and James 
Wilson, both of whom appear to have produced drafts of the Consti-
tution as members of the Committee of Detail.62  Randolph laid 
down two guiding standards for the Committee’s work: 
1. To insert essential principles only, lest the operations of 
government should be clogged by rendering those provisions 
permanent and unalterable, which ought to be accomodated 
[sic] to times and events.  [A]nd  
2. To use simple and precise language, and general proposi-
tions, according to the example of the (several) constitutions 
of the several states.63 
While the second standard seems to shed light on the use of am-
biguous, highly general terms discussed in the introduction,64 the 
  
 60. Jon Elster, Forces and Mechanisms in the Constitution-Making Process, 45 
DUKE L.J. 364, 388 (1995).  
 61. Id.  Elster presents the French Assembly of 1789 as a paradigm of the latter 
mode of constitutional negotiation.  Id. at 388–89.  Fittingly, this public assembly 
produced the theory-rich Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen.  See Rett 
R. Ludwikowski, Fundamental Constitutional Rights in the New Constitutions of 
Eastern and Central Europe, 3 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 73, 78 (1995). 
 62. See Vile, supra note 54, at 163–64. 
 63. 2 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 137 & n.6. 
 64. See supra Part I.  
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first standard is the most relevant to the concerns of this article.  It 
suggests that Randolph saw superfluity in constitutional drafting as a 
threat to the smooth functioning of government.  As circumstances 
change, the basic structures of government must be sufficiently flex-
ible to respond.  Thus, Randolph presumably would have opposed 
attempts by any member of the Committee of Detail to depart from 
the skeletal articulation of rules that the Committee of Detail ulti-
mately produced.  Perhaps Randolph’s resistance to constitutional 
excess also helps to explain the Committee of Detail’s silent rejec-
tion, in its later August 22, 1787 report, of the inclusion of proposed 
rights-related provisions in the body of the Constitution.65 
James Wilson’s resistance to unnecessary theorizing seems to 
have been even more pronounced.  There are hints throughout his 
contributions to the Philadelphia Convention and the Pennsylvania 
ratification debates that he possessed a strong skepticism toward the 
utility of high-level statements of principle and an appreciation of 
the ease with which general principles can be manipulated, ignored, 
and abused.  In a characteristic argument regarding the powers of the 
states, Wilson is recorded as saying: 
The great difficulty, therefore, was the application of this 
general principle [of retained state power], for it was found 
impracticable to enumerate and distinguish the various ob-
jects to which it extended; and as the mathematics only are 
capable of demonstration, it ought not to be thought extraor-
dinary that the convention could not develop a subject in-
volved in such endless perplexity.66 
The idea that mathematics alone, and not the natural language of 
lawyers and legislators, possesses a logically perfect structure sus-
ceptible to endless, certain, consistent inference, is an idea that did 
not receive a warm welcome among many legal thinkers until at 
least the late nineteenth century.67  It is another way of saying that 
  
 65. See Vile, supra note 54, at 166. 
 66. 3 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 140. 
 67. For the critique of formalism in classical legal thought as the abuse of deduc-
tion, see generally Duncan Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal 
Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A 
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general propositions do not decide concrete cases, or, as Wilson 
himself is recorded as stating, “[t]he Beauty of all Knowledge con-
sists in the Application.”68  The phrase suggests that Wilson viewed 
mere theoretical knowledge, prior to its practical application, as in 
some sense empty or lifeless, or at least incomplete.  A preference 
for the pragmatic cashing out of theories in terms of their specific 
applications, rather than the statement of theories in the abstract, is 
one of the hallmarks of American thought.69  Wilson seems to have 
shared this preference, and the Constitution he helped to write re-
flects it by abjuring general principles in favor of operative rules. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The incomplete theorization of our Constitution has not been 
without its costs.  As Sunstein notes in a related context: “[I]f judges 
can agree on an abstraction, and if the abstraction can be shown to be 
a good one, judicial acceptance of that abstraction may hardly be 
troubling but, on the contrary, an occasion for celebration.”70  If a 
theory is good, then a highly theorized agreement might have advan-
tages over an incompletely theorized one.  American history could 
perhaps have been different if the abstract, theoretical statement of 
human equality in the Declaration of Independence had been in-
cluded in our judicially enforceable Constitution.  Indeed, some con-
temporary national constitutions have included abstract statements of 
social and economic rights partly in order to prevent their courts 
from filling any theoretical silence with unwanted principles, as oc-
  
CRITICAL APPRAISAL 19, 39 & n.59 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 
2006). 
 68. 1 FARRAND, supra note 10, at 275. 
 69. See generally, e.g., WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME 
OLD WAYS OF THINKING, in WILLIAM JAMES: WRITINGS: 1902–1910, at 479–619 
(Bruce Kuklick ed., Library of America 1987) (1907).  Cornel West memorably 
identified pragmatism with “the American evasion of philosophy” in a book of 
that name.  See generally CORNEL WEST, THE AMERICAN EVASION OF 
PHILOSOPHY: A GENEALOGY OF PRAGMATISM (1989).  The bare functionality of 
the U.S. Constitution might be interpreted as one of America’s earliest evasions of 
political philosophy. 
 70. Sunstein, supra note 1, at 1766. 
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curred on several occasions in American history, perhaps most nota-
bly in the Lochner era.71  
But viewed as a whole, and considering that any theoretical 
statements included in the Constitution might not have been a cause 
for celebration at the time, but rather for the foundering of the con-
stitutional enterprise, the incomplete theorization of the Constitution 
seems to have been a substantial success.  It removed from debate 
contentious theoretical issues that might have led to the undermining 
of the Philadelphia Convention, a convention that some feared might 
never be replicated if it failed and whose success was perceived as 
vital to the continued security of republican government in the New 
World.72  It allowed for the ratification of a single document despite 
whatever divergent theories of republicanism, religion, race, federal-
ism, or executive power might have existed within and between the 
people of the various states.  And it resulted in the creation of a Con-
stitution that has survived for over two hundred years, despite radi-
cal, ongoing upheavals in the intellectual orientations and moral 
commitments of many of the people who govern themselves through 
it.  If Professor Tribe is right that American constitutional law finds 
itself “at a juncture where profound fault lines have become evident 
at the very foundations of the enterprise,”73 so that the writing of a 
constitutional treatise may not even be possible, this may only be a 
return to the state of profound and intentionally unresolved theoreti-
cal disagreement existing at the time of the Constitution’s framing 
and inscribed in the document through its theoretical silence. 
 
  
 71. See, e.g., Carl Baar, Social Action Litigation in India: The Operation and 
Limits of the World’s Most Active Judiciary, in COMPARATIVE JUDICIAL REVIEW 
AND PUBLIC POLICY 77–86 (Donald W. Jackson & C. Neal Tate eds., 1992) (dis-
cussing the inclusion of non-enforceable social and economic “directive prin-
ciples” in the Indian Constitution out of fear that courts might otherwise read 
Lochner-era principles of substantive due process into the text). 
 72. Alexander Hamilton’s statement of the risk is perhaps the best known: “Hen-
ceforward, the motives will become feebler, and the difficulties greater.  It is a 
miracle that we are now here . . . .  It would be madness to trust to future miracles.  
A thousand causes must obstruct a reproduction of them.”  5 DEBATES ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 259 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1859). 
 73. Laurence H. Tribe, The Treatise Power, 8 GREEN BAG 291, 295 (2005). 
